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Abstract
Along with export promotion (EP), import substitution (IS) is one of the two main trade
strategies for developing countries. We show that an IS industry may remain an infant and
still be able to export. Therefore, the ability to export is not necessarily evidence of import
substitution being effective in the sense of helping a protected domestic industry achieve
international competitiveness over time.
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   Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches to trade policy among developing 
countries – export promotion (EP) versus import substitution (IS). Although the 
distinction between the two strategies is often blurred and many developing countries 
have pursued both, there is nevertheless an unmistakable philosophical difference 
between EP and IS. Advocates of EP emphasize the benefits of free trade and 
competition, and substituting global markets for limited domestic ones. Advocates of 
IS, on the other hand, emphasize the desirability of achieving a higher level of self-
reliance by substituting imported goods with domestic goods behind protectionist 
barriers. This philosophical difference has led to an extensive debate among both 
academics and policymakers about the relative merits of each approach. 
      In this note, we question the validity of the infant industry argument, which is 
widely evoked in support of import substitution.
1 To put it briefly, according to this 
argument, temporary protectionism provides an infant domestic industry with 
breathing space to grow up over time and become internationally competitive. The 
specific mechanisms for growing up over time include achieving greater economies of 
scale and learning-by-doing.
2 As such, central to the infant industry argument is a 
trade-off between the short-term cost of substituting lower-cost imports with higher-
cost domestic goods and the long-term benefit of productive efficiency gains. IS 
advocates carry their argument to its logical conclusion by noting that an IS domestic 
industry may eventually become competitive enough to export. 
   Here we use simple graphical analysis to illustrate the possibility of an IS industry 
being able to export without becoming internationally competitive. That is, it is 
                                                 
1 See Bruton (1998) for a comprehensive review of import substitution trade regime. 
2 Levinsohn (1994) points out that a country pursuing IS must coordinate its trade policy with its 
competition policy. The intuition is that an infant industry’s achieving economies of scale requires a 
combination of domestic market power (i.e. no stringent limits on market share) and protectionism. theoretically possible for an IS industry to export even without its price becoming 
competitive with world prices. Our basic idea is that exporting may increase the 
domestic profits of a firm with market power in a protected market by allowing for 
greater sales and hence greater exploitation of economies of scale.
3 There are two 
channels through which import barriers raise the domestic firms’ profits – not only do 
they protect domestic firms from foreign competition in the domestic market but they 
also make exporting profitable. This is true even for a domestic firm for which 
exporting is inherently unprofitable in the sense that its average cost always exceeds 
the world price. The reason is that the increase in domestic profits due to economies 
of scale may more than offset losses incurred abroad. 
2 The Model 
   The developing-country monopolist of a single homogeneous tradable good faces 
two markets – domestic and world. The world market is perfectly competitive. The 
monopolist thus faces a given world price and marginal revenue, Pw, in the world 
market. The monopolist’s domestic market is closed to imports due to protectionist 
barriers erected under an IS trade policy regime, but the foreign market is open to the 
monopolist’s exports. As can be seen in Figure 1 below, if the monopolist does not 
export, the monopolist would produce and sell Q  and charge a P a. Average cost is still 
declining at Q . If the monopolist does export, it produces  a Q, of which Q  is sold in 
the home market at a price of 
d
P d and the rest is sold abroad at Pw. Exporting thus 
reduces the IS monopolist’s domestic sales and raises its domestic price. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
      I assume the monopolist’s average cost to exceed the world price everywhere, 
                                                 
3 Krugman (1984) offers an alternative explanation for how import protectionism can serve to promote 
exports under economies of scale. Zhang and Zhang (1998) further elaborate upon Krugman’s insight. 
  2including at Q, its minimum efficient size. The monopolist thus suffers losses on all 
the units it exports. Despite such inherently unprofitable nature of exporting, the 
monopolist still exports since doing so as well as selling at home is more profitable 
than selling at home alone under our assumptions. IS and protectionism play a central 
role in our analysis because the monopolist would go out of business if the domestic 
market were opened up to imports. Without protectionist barriers, the IS monopolist 
will not be able to survive in its domestic market, let alone export. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
   The two light rectangles in Figure 2 above represent the gains to the IS monopolist 
from exporting. The upper light rectangle represents the additional profits due to the 
reduction in domestic sales and hence higher price received for each unit sold at 
home. The lower light rectangle represents the additional profits due to realization of 
greater economies of scale. Intuitively, since average costs are declining when the 
monopolist does not export and exporting results in a larger output () , 
exporting reduces the average cost of producing all units. Exporting thus boosts 
profits in the domestic market for two reasons - higher price and lower average cost. 
QQ a >
   The two dark rectangles in Figure 2 represent the losses to the IS monopolist from 
exporting. The upper dark rectangle represents the reduction in profits due to the 
reduction in the amount sold domestically. The lower dark rectangle reflects our 
assumption that the monopolist’s average cost always exceeds the world price. It is 
possible that the sum of the light rectangles exceeds the sum of the dark rectangles. In 
this case, it would pay the monopolist to export even though it incurs a loss on all the 
units it exports. The underlying reason is that the increase in domestic profits due to 
exporting more than compensates the losses incurred due to exporting. 
3 Concluding Remarks 
  3   In this note, we use simple graphical analysis to examine whether exports per se are 
evidence of the success of an IS trade policy regime. Our analysis indicates that it is 
possible for an IS industry to export even without the dynamic effects associated with 
the infant industry argument, according to which a domestic industry protected under 
IS eventually grows up to become internationally competitive. 
   In our analysis, the IS monopolist becomes more efficient only in the very limited 
sense that it moves down a given average cost curve, which remains above the world 
price everywhere. However, there is no growing up in a more fundamental sense of 
the infant industry argument – i.e. the IS industry’s price becoming competitive with 
world price. Indeed, in our analysis, the IS industry faces little incentive to grow up. 
   Therefore, exports per se do not necessarily tell us about whether IS enabled an 
industry to achieve significant efficiency gains over time. In fact, we showed that 
protectionism and economies of scale can combine to render exporting profitable for 
an IS monopolist that inherently cannot compete in world markets. Our analysis 
provides some grounds for caution in viewing exports as evidence of successful IS. 
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